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1. You should not take initiative in raising subject of Germany and Berlin. Should Khrushchev do so it will probably be along established lines with stress on necessity of peace treaty, impossibility of maintaining status quo in Berlin, and Soviet intention at some point to take unilateral action purporting to end Western rights in city, accompanied perhaps by suggestion that since Soviets have advanced proposals on Berlin it is now our turn to make counterproposals.
2. Under these circumstances, you will obviously not wish to get involved in discussion of details, but occasion could be used to press home certain general points essential to complete understanding of US position as well as to probe Soviet intentions and to ascertain whether any new element of flexibility seems to have emerged. After observing that new US Administration has not yet been able to examine all details of German and Berlin question or to consult with our Allies, you might note that certain fundamental and abiding realities exist which must underlie US approach:

a. If, as Khrushchev claims, Berlin is important to Soviets, it is also important to us. This is an area where our commitments are too

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By **MEP** NAHS, Date **2/7/75**

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great for us to remain supine in face of unilateral action aimed at our complete removal.

b. Soviet insistence on taking such unilateral action will not only be dangerous in itself but will jeopardize achievement of those goals in which we may have common interest such as disarmament.

c. Western Powers had hopes that Soviets would be willing to work out some sort of mutually acceptable modus vivendi to defuse Berlin issue, but Soviets have given little sign that this is their objective.

d. President has given thought to events of past few years and finds it difficult to understand why when Soviets profess desire for coexistence they have found it necessary to question situation with which, despite obvious disadvantages to both sides, we have managed to live for many years.

e. We continue, however, to be prepared to discuss this question along with that of Germany as a whole in atmosphere devoid of threat and ultimatum.

f. We know Khrushchev has problems with GDR leaders, who find existence of Free Berlin inimical to their objectives. But continued existence of GDR is likewise inimical to our objective of unified Germany. Both sides must therefore in a sense accept their frustrations and learn to live with them. This is an important aspect of coexistence which should also be applied to Berlin.

g. If Soviet Union and GDR take unilateral action in Berlin and thus create crisis, they will be surprised at unanimity with which American people will support firm governmental policy. It would be illusory to

count on

count on lack of determination on our part or division among Western Allies in face of threat.

h. We, no more than Soviets, wish to devote any further proportion of our resources to arms expenditures. But if there is anything which will bring about a massive increase in US arms expenditures of type which took place at time Korean War it would be conviction Soviets intend attempt to force us out of Berlin by utilizing geographic advantages which Soviets and East Germans admittedly enjoy.

3. If Khrushchev resorts to argument that present arrangements in Berlin are obviously obsolete and no longer correspond to facts of 1961, you may point out that they are no more obsolete than continuing division of Germany of which Berlin situation a symptom incurable in isolation from broader problem. Western Powers have made many proposals for German reunification, and are realistically aware that Khrushchev not prepared to permit reunification based on free expression of popular will. We cannot do anything about this, but we do not see that this therefore involves any obligation on our part to give up three Western Sectors of Berlin and thereby freedom of its population.

4. If Khrushchev argues that Soviet QUOTE free city UNQUOTE proposal would preserve freedom of Berliners, you might say that propaganda is one thing and realities of life another. We know enough about views and expectations of East German leaders to be aware that they consider QUOTE free city UNQUOTE as nothing more than brief transitional phase leading to total absorption. We must be honest with each other. Each knows

knows its own interest in this situation, what it can give up and what it must preserve. He cannot expect us to be deceived by mere slogans.

5. If Khrushchev says that it is now turn of West to make proposals on Berlin, you might refer to fact that West has made certain proposals in past which proved unacceptable to Soviets. In due course, we shall consult with our Allies and put forward our ideas. But West cannot be expected to propose that essentials of its position be abandoned. (If it seems desirable at this point you might attempt sound out Khrushchev on his receptivity to possible all-Berlin proposal by noting that his claim that situation in Berlin is abnormal is true in sense that city remains divided. Real solution to problem would therefore logically be in agreement between four powers on all-Berlin arrangement.)
6. If Khrushchev says he cannot wait much longer and must soon proceed to sign peace treaty with GDR, you might note that, while we cannot stop him from doing this, a major interest to us must be effect peace treaty has on our position in Berlin. We cannot, of course, be party to legalized partition of Germany. If arrangements similar to those under Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters are still provided for, while we would regret further confirmation of split of Germany, we would adjust to situation.

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